ScanRecords

Companies / WhatsApp

WhatsApp

Can't read your messages
owned by Meta

Messenger and Instagram DMs — same owner, not end-to-end encrypted, and scanning under Chat Control. Meta's record →

What we watch for — WhatsApp's content is end-to-end encrypted, which keeps it out of Chat Control's scope. We watch for weakened encryption claims, client-side scanning language, or new qualifiers around E2EE in these documents.
Status
Can't read your messages
Held since
26 Jul 2026
Documents
3 tracked
App Store label
Tracked
Changes recorded
9 — latest 1 Sep 2026

Tracked documents

DocumentLast fetchedSizeHashSnapshot
Privacy Policy (EEA)
www.whatsapp.com
1 Sep 2026 103,210 chars 14842557aa59 text · raw · wayback
Security / E2EE description
www.whatsapp.com
1 Sep 2026 3,508 chars cff0d328754f text · raw · wayback
Google Play Data Safety
play.google.com
26 Jul 2026 2,597 chars e97bd9d12058 text · raw · wayback

text is the extracted record we hash and diff; raw is the page's original HTML kept verbatim as evidence — it renders without its styling here, by design.

App Store privacy label — WhatsApp Messenger

Apple requires every app to declare the data it collects. This is WhatsApp's current declaration, as shown on the App Store; ScanRecords records when it changes.

Data Linked to You

  • Purchases
  • Financial Info
  • Location
  • Contact Info
  • Contacts
  • User Content
  • Identifiers
  • Usage Data
  • Diagnostics

Data Not Linked to You

  • Search History

What we searched for

A status that rests on absence is only as good as the search behind it. Every one of WhatsApp's 3 archived documents (109,318 characters) was searched for the same published vocabulary used on every company here — in English, German and French. The search is a plain function of the archived text and re-runs whenever that text changes, so it always describes the documents listed above. Re-run it against this archive yourself with tools/scan-terms.mjs.

TermHitsIn context
CSAM / CSAE 3 “…munity and group pictures and reported images against a database of known hashed child sexual abuse material (CSAM) and use a combination of automated processing techniques and human review to detect previously unknown CSAM…” — privacy
“…(CSAM) and use a combination of automated processing techniques and human review to detect previously unknown CSAM in these images. If we detect apparent CSAM, we report it to the National Center for Missing & Exploited Chil…” — privacy
“…ocessing techniques and human review to detect previously unknown CSAM in these images. If we detect apparent CSAM, we report it to the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children (learn more about how we work to help f…” — privacy
child sexual abuse / Kindesmissbrauch 1 “…compare profile pictures, community and group pictures and reported images against a database of known hashed child sexual abuse material (CSAM) and use a combination of automated processing techniques and human review to detect previousl…” — privacy

Found nowhere in these documents: Regulation 2021/1232 · derogation / Ausnahmeregelung / dérogation · Chat Control / Chatkontrolle · ePrivacy · NCMEC / CyberTipline · PhotoDNA · hash matching / hash database · Internet Watch Foundation · scan / scanning / gescannt · automated detection / automatisierte Erkennung · classifier / machine learning detection · monitor content / review content

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